Document Type: Reports

Summary

This study examines the impact of semi-industrial gold mining on local conflict and security dynamics in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It provides an in-depth analysis of the context in which semi-industrial gold mining companies have been established in Mwenga territory (South Kivu province) since 2017, and of their impact on the fragile security situation (Map 1).

The intersection between conflict and gold mining in Mwenga began as early as 1997 when the gold mines of the Société Minière et Industrielle du Kivu (SOMINKI, a former state mining company) were overrun by artisanal miners and rebel movements. Two decades later, conflicts still persist in the area, causing Banro Corporation, the multinational company that acquired the majority of SOMINKI’s shares, to cease its mining activities in 2019 due to violence against its employees. While Banro’s industrial operations were paralyzed, gold mining by semi-industrial companies – often Chinese-owned – increased significantly. Between 2017 and 2019, six semi-industrial companies established themselves in the territory, including Congo Blueant Minerals SARL and Société Orientale Ressources Congo SARL (ORC) (Map 2). Since their arrival, local populations, civil society and state authorities have complained about these companies’ behavior.

This report discusses how these semi-industrial companies have established themselves in Mwenga, as well as the impact of their practices on the security situation. The study uses the notion of ‘practical norms’ to explain the companies’ strategies to set up and secure their operations. ‘Practical norms’ refer to the gap between actual informal practices and the legal provisions that regulate the mining sector. It is a set of informal norms that underpin the practices of actors who deviate from official norms, notably the mining laws in this case. First, the practices of these companies do not abide by or adhere to the mining law and formal regulations governing the mining sector. Second, in order to acquire access to gold deposits, they sign partnership agreements with mining cooperatives, which serve as fronts for the companies. Consequently, the cooperatives do not act in the best interests of the artisanal miners whom they supposedly represent. To date, the details of these agreements remain opaque. Third, the mining companies continue to operate with the support of a vast predatory network involving state, customary, and military authorities at various levels.

In order to illustrate the complexity of these networks, this study presents the different actors, the challenges they face, as well as the strategies they have developed to navigate the gold mining sector.

The geographies where the semi-industrial miners work have become areas that operate outside of government control without mining taxation or traceability of mineral production. State mining services and local authorities do not dare to enter the mines because of heavy militarization in and around the mines through the deployment of large numbers of soldiers of the national army (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC) and police, who are perceived as so-called ‘Chinese guards’. This excessive presence of security forces also lies at the root of illegal taxation and has led to arbitrary arrests.

Traditional chiefs can be considered key actors enabling installation of semi-industrial companies in Mwenga. They have organized social dialogues to convince local populations to accept these companies’ operations, dialogues often perceived as a way to silence, and even intimidate, the population.

At the heart of tensions surrounding semi-industrial gold mining in Mwenga are civil society actors who have been the main whistleblowers. The advance of semi-industrialization has however also led to the creation of multiple new civil society organizations and a climate of division between them. This does not happen by chance but is rather the intended consequence of a policy of ‘divide and rule’ developed by the mining companies and their supporters. The semi-industrial exploitation of gold has thus become one of the main drivers of insecurity, at times involving local militias. This insecurity manifests itself not only in terms of physical violence, but through the destruction of the means of subsistence of local populations.

In addition to the arrival of foreign-owned companies, the process of ‘semi-industrialization’ is characterized by the spread of quartz stone crushers in the artisanal gold supply chain of South Kivu. The introduction of hundreds of crushing mills at several ASM sites has changed labor relations and favored the emergence of local entrepreneurship with a direct impact on the production of gold. Unfortunately, these machines also cause accidents and a number of pollution-related illnesses. The spread of these crushing mills has also triggered conflicts with mining cooperatives. Even though these conflicts have not turned into violence, it does show that the mere process of semi-industrialization, in general, entails risks beyond the arrival of (foreign) mining companies.

Finally, the study highlights long-term security risks, as semi-industrial mining is a major source of predation, social destruction and conflict. First, semi-industrial gold mining actors operate in well-established, powerful networks that enable predatory behavior against local populations. Operating from the national capital of Kinshasa, the South Kivu capital of Bukavu, and at the mining sites, these networks involve state authorities, heads of the mining administration, the military and police, as well as customary authorities. It is thus hard to tackle this climate of predation. The second risk factor concerns the way in which semi-industrial gold mining affects mining governance, namely by creating areas where the State cannot control activities and production, by fostering suspicion over corruption by state and customary authorities, and by making the gold trade more opaque. Thirdly, a heavy price is paid in terms of social cohesion as semi-industrial gold mining creates deep divisions within local civil society and pits traditional chiefs against their own populations. Therefore, there is a risk of score-settling by dissatisfied populations in which local militias may become active. These risks urgently need to be addressed if the gold sector is to be beneficial to the DRC and its people.

The report concludes with recommendations that aim to address the negative impacts, conflicts and security risks associated with semi-industrial mining activities. They recommend a few actions that will encourage semi-industrial operators to comply with mining regulations and to promote peaceful coexistence between semi-industrial operators and local populations. Finally, they highlight the importance of raising local populations’ awareness of their rights with regard to companies’ mining operations.

Between 2019 and 2023, USAID and PepsiCo partnered to test the business case for women’s empowerment in the PepsiCo potato supply chain in West Bengal, India. Women are heavily involved in potato farming in West Bengal but often in overlooked areas of work such as seed cutting and seed treatment, which are typically done at home. As a result, most PepsiCo registered farmers are men. The partnership hypothesized that increasing women’s visibility and participation in PepsiCo’s supply chain would positively contribute to important tangible and intangible business metrics for the company, including increased productivity and profitability for farming families, adoption of sustainable farming practices, increased supplier base size and retention, and improved brand loyalty. The four-year partnership, implemented through the Integrated Land and Resource Governance (ILRG) program, worked with women and men farmers in 11 target communities, as well as with PepsiCo employees to increase gender equality awareness and women’s access to productive resources. Activities with men
and women farmers included:

• Agronomy training for 1,888 women farmers;
• Deployment of 17 women Community Agronomists (CAs) to increase outreach to women;
• Support to seven women’s land leasing groups (LLGs);
• Land literacy training for 838 farmers (542 women and 296 men);
• Support to 11 women-led demonstration farms that showcased proper PepsiCo practices, visited by 305 people (225 women and 80 men);
• Entrepreneurship training for 26 people (21 women and 5 men); and
• Gender norms training for 289 farmers (174 women and 115 men).

In addition, ILRG also strengthened the gender capacity of all PepsiCo staff in West Bengal through in-person training on gender equality, women’s empowerment, and gender-based violence (GBV), asynchronous microlearning via WhatsApp, the development of written resources, and ongoing mentoring and support.

ILRG collected quantitative and qualitative data to measure impacts related to women’s empowerment and business results. The project-level Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (Pro-WEAI) assessment found that overall women’s empowerment decreased for all women in the region from baseline to endline, which could be attributed to the economic and social repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the Pro-WEAI empowerment score worsened for both women in the treatment and control groups, the decline was less pronounced for women in the treatment group, suggesting ILRG interventions could have provided some protection for women’s empowerment in a challenging environment. The broader body of quantitative and qualitative data collected shows progress in specific domains of women’s economic empowerment (WEE), including self-efficacy and confidence, access to knowledge, control of resources, control of income, decision-making power, acceptance by family and community members, and collective agency. There was a notable shift in women being recognized as farmers, instead of “farmers’ wives.” Women reported greater decision-making power over decisions related to the use of land, agriculture production, and use of income. Influential male champions were crucial to shifting harmful gender norms at the community level through positive role modeling and helping project staff overcome initial resistance of some men to the activities.

The data shows positive business results. Over 97 percent of women applied skills gained through agronomy training, positively impacting potato productivity and profitability. Families with trained women had better gross and net yields. In Year 4, 84 percent of women farmers reported an increase in their farm yield compared to the previous year, 76 percent reported a decrease in rejection rates, and 77 percent reported experiencing a positive change in their household income since associating with PepsiCo. The overall Sustainable Farming Program (SFP) score improved by 170 percent in the target communities but remained low compared to other areas (overall sustainability score of 74 percent versus 77 percent in Year 4). There is emerging evidence that reaching and empowering women can lead to greater stability and growth of the PepsiCo supply base in West Bengal, with women joining the supply chain at a higher rate than men. Additionally, women have been responsible for recommending PepsiCo potato cultivation to others. Finally, the data shows a marked shift in PepsiCo’s staff attitudes, knowledge, and behaviors toward gender equality. At the end of the project, 76 percent of PepsiCo staff agreed that women’s participation adds value to the business and 84 percent said they observed positive changes in farming communities or PepsiCo’s business metrics that they attribute to women’s empowerment activities.

Despite challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic and untimely rains that led to significant losses in Year 3, the results demonstrate that there is a business case for promoting women’s empowerment in PepsiCo’s potato supply chain in West Bengal and potentially in other markets with a similar supplier model. However, some elements of the project proved difficult to pursue, such as the land component. There is room for improvement and a need for better data points for future and continued assessment. These areas include early alignment on business case elements and sustainability of interventions; strengthening women’s ownership, access to, and control over land; promoting equitable work sharing at the household level; increasing women’s representation in the entire supply chain (as suppliers, aggregators, and PepsiCo staff); and setting up efficient data monitoring and governance processes.

Introduction

Ghana is the second-largest cocoa producer in the world, with cocoa representing a vital part of the country’s economy. Gender inequality is pervasive within the cocoa sector due to a combination of unequal access to productive resources and harmful gender norms at the household, community, and institutional levels. Although women are involved in nearly all the steps of cocoa production in Ghana, cocoa is largely considered a man’s crop, and women’s roles and contributions remain unrecognized, undervalued, and often unpaid. Land ownership is a key barrier; because women typically do not own or lease land on their own, they are not perceived as farmers by themselves, their families, communities, or other stakeholders in the supply chain. Commodity trading companies are responsible for procuring cocoa from smallholder farmers for major international chocolate brands. These companies not only interact with farmers on the technical aspects of cocoa production but also play a critical role in cocoa communities, often implementing social development initiatives in partnership with chocolate brands and international development funders and organizations.

In this context, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) partnered with Ecom Agroindustrial Corp. (ECOM), a global commodity trading and processing company, to promote gender equality and empower women in the cocoa value chain in Ghana. The goal was to increase gender-responsiveness in ECOM’s internal policies and practices and pilot targeted women’s empowerment activities in cocoa communities where the company operates. Working directly with a cocoa commodity trader provides opportunities for greater sustainability and scalability of USAID investments, as the company can replicate successful gender-responsive approaches in multiple cocoa-sourcing communities in Ghana and West Africa, particularly in future partnerships with chocolate brands. The partnership was implemented between 2020 and 2023 under the USAID Integrated Land and Resource Governance (ILRG) activity, a global mechanism managed by Tetra Tech. Preparatory work, including an initial gender analysis and project design, started in 2020 and was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Implementation of activities with ECOM staff and in cocoa communities began in mid-2022 and concluded in mid-2023.

The project was informed by an initial gender analysis that provided a better understanding of ECOM’s gender equality practices and capacity, as well as the barriers and opportunities for women’s empowerment, particularly related to access to productive resources and income diversification opportunities. The gender analysis found that although ECOM promoted gender equality within the company and in its work with cocoa farmers, it lacked clear policies, strategies, and expertise to guide and institutionalize such efforts. Women’s representation in field positions was very low, and ECOM signed contracts with individual farmers based on their status as landowners, which meant most contracts were signed with men. Despite the company’s attempts to provide men and women equal opportunity and access to resources, in practice, women’s lack of land ownership led to less access to inputs, training and extension, technology, and financial services. Harmful gender norms affected the division of labor on the farm and in the household and limited women’s benefit-sharing and decision-making power over income derived from cocoa.

The concepts of ‘mining’ and ‘conflict financing’ have been closely linked in conflict analyses in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) over the past 20 years. The conflict, as well as conflict financing, has however changed considerably in eastern DRC over the past twenty years. It is therefore necessary to reconsider the concept of ‘conflict minerals’, as new types of conflict linked to mining have occurred, and more different types of actors are involved than before.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In late 2017, almost fifteen years after the end of the second Congo war, and after several years of relative peaceful coexistence, inter-communal tensions flared up once again in Ituri province, in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In December 2017, isolated violent incidents between members of the Hema and Lendu communities provoked an escalation and heralded the beginning of a new cycle of deadly violence and large-scale internal displacements. In 2021, the persistent violence in eastern DRC, particularly in the provinces of Ituri and North Kivu, led the DRC government to impose ‘martial law.’

By zooming in on Djugu territory, an area rich in gold in the center of Ituri, this report provides a detailed description of local conflict dynamics. During the second Congo war (1998-2003), economic stakes were high and access to gold drove several conflict actors (Congolese and regional) in Ituri to resort to violence as they sought for control of the high value resource.1 This report investigates the link between the exploitation of gold in Djugu territory and the current conflict. It addresses the question of whether the current conflicts in Ituri province result from competition over mineral resources, or is the presence of gold mines rather an opportunity to finance war efforts? Although nowadays gold does not seem to be the prime cause of conflict, it is becoming increasingly an important asset in the survival strategies of armed groups.

Two important contextual elements in Djugu should be highlighted: the economic importance of gold mining and the importance of ethnicity in the local administration. The discovery of gold in Djugu and Ituri dates back to the early 1900s. Over the following decades, industrial gold mining boomed, but by the end of the century it collapsed completely, because of a declining economy, the degradation of mining infrastructure, and devastating civil wars. At present gold in Ituri is exclusively mined by artisanal and semi-industrial miners.

Throughout the twentieth century, first colonial and then former President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mobutu Sese Seko’s policies led to inter-communal tensions, particularly between Hema and Lendu, but also between other communities in Ituri. For example, access to land and customary power led to fierce inter-communal competition.

During the second Congo war (1998 – 2003) most rebel groups were supported by neighboring states, while today, apart from the recent violent resurgence of the Rwanda-backed M23 group in the province of North Kivu, armed groups, for example in Ituri, seem much more locally rooted and less dependent on foreign states. This study focuses on two non-state armed groups which are active in Djugu, notably the Coopérative de Développement Économique du Congo (CODECO) and its factions, and Jeunesse/’Zaïre’, a group of self-defense militias. CODECO claims to mobilize in defense of Lendu communities to protect them against the perceived domination by other communities (mainly Hema), and against the Congolese national army (FARDC). In response to the violence perpetrated by CODECO, several armed self-defense groups have been created.

In May 2021, current President Antoine Tshisekedi declared martial law in Ituri and North Kivu provinces, effectively suspending the provincial civilian government and granting full executive power to the military governor. By imposing martial law, the government aimed to deal with armed violence more efficiently and to restore peace in a durable way. By early 2023, it is clear that martial law has failed in its mission, as violence has not stopped. It even seems that government security forces, rather than bringing a solution to the conflicts, have become part of the problem. CODECO factions regularly erupt into violence, and the FARDC has made local informal security arrangements with armed groups, including with Jeunesse/’Zaïre’.

When trying to understand the political economy of armed conflicts in Ituri province, and more specifically in Djugu territory, gold mining is an important factor. Since 2021, gold has become an increasingly important source of financing for both Jeunesse/’Zaïre’, and even more so for CODECO. The UN Group of Experts reported that the control over the gold mining sites around Mongbwalu was an important explanatory factor in CODECO’s territorial expansion in 2022. On top of that, Jeunesse/’Zaïre’ has allegedly also prioritized conquering new gold mines around Mongbwalu. Members of armed groups either operate mines themselves, levy taxes on the gold production, or are involved in mineral trading and/or smuggling. Compounding the problem of armed groups trying to access and control gold mines is that state security services take advantage of their broader mandate in the context of martial law to benefit from the mining as well. However, gold mining is not the only source of income: armed groups also erect roadblocks to tax passers-by, or impose taxes on households and shopkeepers in certain villages (this contribution is referred to as ‘war effort’).

Today’s armed conflict in Djugu, Ituri, however, was not caused by competition for control over gold. Hostilities started in 2017-2018 in agricultural and livestock farming areas where few mining sites are located, and only moved towards gold mining zones at a later stage (2020-2021). Armed groups moved gradually into Djugu’s mining areas as the conflicts persisted. CODECO did so in search of new resources as part of their survival strategy. Jeunesse/’Zaïre’ wanted to protect land and mining sites that they consider as part of their community’s patrimony against the aggression of CODECO.

Finally, the report explains other crucial elements that help to explain the persistence of the conflict and that downplay the role of gold to a certain extent. Land issues form the basis of long-lasting tensions between communities in Ituri. Seemingly trivial disagreements have shown the potential to deteriorate into violence. Violence has especially, but not solely, been observed in the enclosed zones (territorial patchwork, metaphorically referred to as “skin of the leopard”), whose limits are constantly disputed. Land ownership, customary land rights, and access to land in general are key drivers of conflict. Mining is also intrinsically linked to the land issue and the nexus between gold and conflict is therefore inseparable from it.

Customary (or traditional) authorities and ‘old sages’ (les vieux sages, i.e., elderly wise men/advisors) are crucial actors in the management of land issues and disputes in the mining sector. Holding the responsibility to grant access to land and mines, these elders often create mining-related conflicts. Moreover, a link seems to exist between customary authorities and armed groups. In some cases, it seems unlikely that armed self-defense factions would be able to operate in a certain area without the approval of, or at least tolerance by, the local authorities. Finally, the failure of multiple historical.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs is a key factor explaining the persistence of armed groups. In the past years, several CODECO factions have started talks with the government about surrender. However, the effective implementation of DDR programs is proving difficult to achieve and combatants are drawn back into armed groups.

In conclusion, unlike the conflict in Ituri during the second Congo war (1998-2003), which must be considered as a conflict resulting from competition over access to resources, the current conflicts seem to be much more rooted in a complex web of long-standing community grievances about real or perceived social inequalities, unequal access to land, and political power distributions that are perceived as unfair. Gold mining and access to other natural resources are not the primary causes of the present-day conflicts but have increasingly become crucial assets in the survival strategies of armed groups who continue to destabilize the province. The fact that inter-communal tensions flared after several years of relatively peaceful coexistence, rapidly deteriorating into large-scale inter-communal violence, is a matter of serious concern, indicating that unresolved disputes have been simmering for a long time and that long-lasting peace will not return unless fundamental local issues linked to land access, customary authority, mining governance, and social and political inequalities between communities are dealt with, or at least have been put on the agendas of local and national governments.

Overview of Tenure Issues with Forests and Cocoa

Côte d’Ivoire’s forests have decreased from 16 million hectares in 1900 to 7.8 million hectares in 1990 and to 3.4 million hectares in 2015 (GoCI, 2018). Today 11 percent of the country’s surface area is forested. Of the remaining forests, 39 percent are located in protected areas, 25 percent in gazetted areas (forêts classées) and 36 percent in rural areas (GoCI, 2019b). From 1990 to 2000, rural areas lost the most forest at an annual rate of 7 percent, whereas between 2000 and 2015, gazetted forests were lost the fastest at 4 percent per year (GoCI, 2019b). Today there are 387 forest logging permits covering rural and gazetted lands, though historically logging has been concentrated in rural areas (GoCI, 2019b).

Agriculture – especially cocoa – has been the primary driver of deforestation in Côte d’Ivoire in recent decades (World Bank, 2019). There are an estimated 3.5 million hectares of cocoa plantations – more than remaining forests – of which 750,000 hectares are located in gazetted areas (GoCI, 2019b). Farms are all smallholder and produce on average 40 percent of the world’s cocoa supply, with annual exports exceeding two million tons in 2018 (World Bank, 2019). A fifth of the population depends on cocoa for a living. As land availability in rural areas has diminished, farmers have moved into gazetted forests and protected areas, which today account for a quarter of national production (RFI, 2019).

Two important features differentiate Côte d’Ivoire’s tenure arrangements for cocoa compared to Ghana. First, Côte d’Ivoire’s farms have a different settlement history, with the vast majority established during migrations to forest zones by outsider ethnic groups, mainly the baoulé ethnic group as well as foreigners, mainly from Burkina Faso (OFPRA, 2017). These migrations picked up in the 1940s as part of colonial policy and administrative strategies to attract labor (USAID, 2016) but they intensified after independence to a point where migrants outnumbered locals in many areas (Ruf, 2020).

Migration in the 1970s was driven by President Houphouët Boigny’s slogan “the land is owned by whoever puts it to use” (“la terre appartient à celui qui la met en valeur”). Clearing forest helped secure access to land (Bymolt et al., 2018), and along with a government policy favoring full-sun cocoa varieties (Schulte et al., 2020), migrants had a strong incentive to clear natural forests. Customary arrangements varied and evolved, with most initially governed by the tutorat system of integrating outsiders through sharing of production and gifts with a representative of the land-owning family (Chauveau, 2007).

These arrangements became more monetized as land pressure increased (Chauveau, 2007) and in some instances transitioned to outright land sales from the 1950s (Wily, 2015) but especially the 1970s and1980s (Chauveau, 2007). In the 1990s and 2000s, new tenure arrangements called planter-partager (plant and share) took hold whereby outsiders would clear forests and build a farm and then half of the farm would revert to the landowner upon crop maturity. The new paradigm could be explained by land-owning groups becoming more aware of the value of holding onto land while “financing” the labor needed to establish a viable plantation (Colin & Ruf, 2011). Specific tenure agreements are diverse, with as many as 15 typologies (Wily, 2015). While some of these arrangements resemble those found in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire differs in the preponderance of migrant farmers and also the violence and politicization of cocoa belt land disputes in the 1990s and 2000s (Chauveau, 2000).

A second distinguishing feature of Côte d’Ivoire is the history of centralized state-driven approaches to land and forest management in disregard of customary practices. This has led to legal pluralism (Lamarche, 2019) and a schism between laws and what is done in practice (OFPRA, 2017). While Ghana has similar features, there is no equivalent of recognized “stool lands” in Côte d’Ivoire despite the existence of parallel customary systems. Instead the rural land law recognizes customary rights only as a temporary stepping stone towards a national titling system controlled by the central government (GoCI, 2017; OFPRA, 2017). This leads to considerable challenges in securing land tenure despite over US$100 million in donor support in recent years (Dagrou & Loroux, 2017; Wily, 2015).

Against this backdrop, the issue of tree tenure has gained increasing attention from several fronts. First, difficulties implementing tree cover and tree planting requirements under standards like the Rainforest Alliance’s Cocoa Certification Program drew attention to misaligned tenure incentives (Ruf & Varlet, 2017). Meanwhile the current government has embraced the concept of “zero-deforestation cocoa” as part of its broader commitment to increasing the country’s forest cover from 11 percent to 20 percent by 2030 (GoCI, 2018). The new forest code of 2019 explicitly addresses tree tenure for the first time and gives primacy to the underlying landowner (GoCI, 2019a). The logic underlying such reforms is as follows: just as secure land tenure is a key predictor of higher cocoa productivity (Schulte et al., 2020), secure tree tenure can incentivize agroforestry. However, as discussed below, Côte d’Ivoire shows that this is not straightforward in practice.