



**USAID'S ARTISANAL MINING AND
PROPERTY RIGHTS PROJECT**
UNDER THE STRENGTHENING TENURE
AND RESOURCE RIGHTS II (STARR II) IDIQ
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF USAID'S PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND ARTISANAL DIAMOND DEVELOPMENT (PRADD II)
PROJECT IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE
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ARTISANAL MINING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS TASK ORDER UNDER THE STRENGTHENING TENURE AND RESOURCE RIGHTS II (STARR II) IDIQ

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF USAID'S PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ARTISANAL DIAMOND DEVELOPMENT (PRADD II) PROJECT IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFOR	The Rural Land Agency (<i>Agence foncière rurale</i>)
ANADER	National Rural Development Support Agency (<i>Agence nationale d'appui au développement rural</i>)
ASM	Artisanal and Small-scale Mining
CVGFR	Village Land Management Committee (<i>Commission villageoise de gestion foncière rurale</i>)
KP	Kimberley Process
KPCS	Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PRADD II	Property Rights and Artisanal Diamonds Development II (<i>Droits de Propriété et Développement du Diamant Artisanal</i>)
SDP	Strategic Development Plans
SMARTER	Sustainable Mining by Artisanal Miners
SODEMI	State Company for the Mining Development of Côte d'Ivoire (<i>Société de Développement Minier</i>)
STARR	Strengthening Tenure and Resource Rights
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

I.0 INTRODUCTION

This report presents the findings from a performance evaluation of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Property Rights and Artisanal Diamonds Development (PRADD II) project in Côte d'Ivoire. To support the Government of Côte d'Ivoire's objective of making the mining sector an engine of economic growth, the objective of PRADD II was to increase the number of alluvial diamonds entering the formal chain of custody, while improving the benefits accruing to diamond mining communities.

USAID and the European Union funded PRADD II and Tetra Tech implemented the project at the national level and in the localities of Séguéla and Tortiya from 2013 to 2018.

This study examines the performance, outcomes, and sustainability of PRADD II interventions five years after the end of the program. The research investigates output sustainability by examining whether the program investments still remain and/or if these have been scaled-up by different beneficiaries. The study also examines reasons for the expansion or decline of specific interventions in light of political, institutional, and economic changes in the national and local contexts of Séguéla and Tortiya.

The evaluation methodology is based on a variety of different sources: a document review; 16 individual interviews conducted with stakeholders at central and local levels; 33 focus group discussions organized with different categories of project stakeholders; surveys carried out with 188 beneficiaries, 13 village chiefs, and 9 mining officials; and direct observation of project sites. The primary data analysis methods include descriptive statistics of surveys combined with content analysis of the qualitative data sources.

I.1 FINDINGS

I.1.1 KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME (KPCS) COMPLIANCE

The evaluation finds that the Kimberley Process (KP) is functioning weakly at the national and local levels. The chain of custody has mostly collapsed in Tortiya and there is significant dysfunction in Séguéla. The problems identified include a significant reduction in the registration of workers (individuals without mining licenses and/or the non-renewal of mining licenses) and widespread informal production and clandestine exploitation outside the framework of traceability, control, and enforcement. The limited presence of the KP Secretariat reduces monitoring and diminishes proper coordination of actors at the operational level.

The risk of a collapse in KP activities is primarily due to the downward trend in diamond production and resource constraints experienced by the Secretariat. A constant decline in production demonstrates the alluvial diamond scarcity since the end of the project, down 27.4 percent from 2018 to 2021. This downward trend in diamond production contributes to activities and behaviors that go against the proper functioning of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS).

Despite these challenges, KP knowledge remains anchored in the practices of the functioning local mining cooperatives that PRADD II supported. At the national level, the Secretariat attempts to maintain activities by collecting information and producing reports on the state of production entering into the formal export circuit, organizing (irregular) meetings, and participating in international exchanges. Since 2018, the Secretariat has continued its mandate related to control and monitoring of import-export activities, capacity building, and international cooperation. There have been some achievements in improving the institutional framework for mining.

See Figure I below for a high-level summary of the key outcome indicators for KPCS compliance. Green indicates sustainability with some continued evidence of positive effects; red indicates no or very little

evidence of sustainability or positive long-term outcomes; and yellow indicates low and varied results by site (Séguéla and Tortiya).

Figure 1: Outcomes for KPCS Compliance Indicators

KPCS Compliance	Indicator	Outcome
	Proportion of exports legally registered	Yellow
	Chain of custody status	Yellow
	Worker cards	Red
	KPCS knowledge	Green
	Use of legal diamond selling offices	Yellow

1.1.2 GOVERNANCE OF ARTISANAL AND SMALL-SCALE MINING

The evaluation finds that of the 16 mining cooperatives, only four are currently functional in areas where diamond production has continued as of 2021 and 2022 (e.g., Bobi, Dualla, Oussougoula, and Diarabana). These four retain elements of institutional strengthening work (organization and functionality) from PRADD II. Specifically, there is evidence of continued site checks, maintenance of production logs, public sales, accountability, and financing of community infrastructure with some level of transparency.

Mining cooperatives face many sustainability challenges. Diamond scarcity is the biggest challenge as it leads to follow-on effects such as a lack of a mining workforce as workers shift to gold mining and small budgets confine the cooperatives to unsuitable production techniques.¹ The development of informal mining activities also weakens the control of mining cooperatives. Collusion between supervisors and workers and other clandestine activities drives much of the informal diamond. Finally, there is very little evidence of improved production and site rehabilitation techniques (known as smarter mining techniques) developed by the PRADD II project.

Communication and trust between the State Company for the Mining Development of Côte d'Ivoire (SODEMI) and the cooperatives is necessary for the proper functioning of the KPCS at the operational level because it facilitates the rigorous application of the KP procedures. SODEMI continues to meet with mining cooperatives and local community leaders. SODEMI also seeks to build and improve relations with the communities by initiating donations to the communities, including school benches and tables, and motorcycles for transport.

However, although still cordial, relations between SODEMI and local communities have deteriorated over the past five years. The diamond scarcity has contributed to relations deterioration between SODEMI and local artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) actors, along with the Secretariat's absence from the field to coordinate actors and facilitate dialogue. Diamond scarcity has exacerbated distrust about the locations and plans to exploit future production sites whether through industrial or semi-industrial methods. Local mining cooperatives emphasize the need to exploit the kimberlites through semi-mechanized methods. However, SODEMI highlights the regulatory framework, as well as institutional and financial constraints, that do not facilitate a shift to semi-mechanized methods. The relegation of mining to a secondary activity in favor of agriculture exacerbates this tension, given the lack of a system for compensation for plantations that might be destroyed by future industrial mining activity.

See Figure 2 below for a high-level summary of the key outcome indicators for ASM Governance. As in Figure 1, green indicates sustainability with some continued evidence of positive effects; red indicates no

¹ Respondents highlighted the absence of strong leadership in some communities and general institutional constraints.

or very little evidence of sustainability or positive long-term outcomes; and yellow indicates low and varied results by site (Séguéla and Tortiya).

Figure 2: Outcomes for ASM Governance Indicators

ASM Governance	Indicator	Color
	SODEMI and local relations	Yellow
	Mining site conflict	Green
	Functioning mining cooperatives	Green
	Investment in community infrastructure	Yellow
	Application of SMART Mining techniques	Red
	Rehabilitation of mining sites	Red

1.1.3 SECURITY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

Land demarcation remains a pertinent topic in the localities visited. Most communities in the study area appreciate the delimitation process. Community leaders and villagers report the process as beneficial, and that they see the demarcation of territories as an asset for securing land rights. Most of the spaces demarcated and completed under PRADD II are consolidated and recognized by local communities. Inspired by the community approach developed by PRADD II, the villages have delimited additional sections and validated them within the framework of new projects led by the Ministry of Agriculture in Séguéla.

However, for some actors and villages, the delimitation is as a process that has dispossessed them of the right to control certain areas and calls into question their boundaries. The intensity of mining and the degrees of organization and performance of mining cooperative societies explain the variation in the perceived delimitation process outcomes. Specifically, Diarabana’s disputed areas have mining potential resulting from the discovery of kimberlite. The anticipation of subsequent mining fuels intercommunity tensions, and the communities in conflict reject the idea of an equitable distribution of the mining rent that would result from the mining exploitation of these sites.

The evaluation finds some evidence of sustainability of PRADD II’s boundary conflict resolution mechanisms, which aimed to mitigate the risks of confrontations through dialogue. This is mainly through a local nongovernmental organizations (NGO) adoption of the approach. Community leaders from Séguéla share the experience of the collaborative framework and the culture of dialogue in other communities within the NGO’s other projects.

To promote land use planning, strategic development plans were to form the base for consensual management of land use and utilization of local economic opportunities. However, the evaluation found that only one village in the study area utilizes the strategic development plan. This component’s sustainability failed due to the lack of commitment from local leaders. It is unclear if the strategic development plans would have been effective and sustainable if diamond production continued unabated.

Similarly, the cashew plantation mapping and the process of obtaining a plantation certificate have diminished. The evaluation found demand lacking amongst citizens to pursue the certification process for cashew tree plantations. Locals did not see a need to spend time and scarce resources on the certificates given the existence of effective customary tenure arrangements for managing cashew farms.

Finally, since diamond production has significantly fallen and mining rents are very low, the evaluation is not able to identify changes in livelihood outcomes driven by more secure property rights to income from mining. See Figure 3 below for a high-level summary of the key outcome indicators for property rights security.

Figure 3: Outcomes for Security of Property Rights Indicators

Securing property rights	Perceived tenure security	Green
	Status of boundary conflicts	Green
	Land use planning	Red

I.1.4 IMPROVED LIVELIHOODS

Although limited, five years after PRADD II, there is some evidence of remaining contributions to local development and food security through livelihood diversification activities. Diamonds contributed to local development when mining was predominant; people benefited individually and collectively. However, with the decrease in diamond production, there is a decline in individual incomes and investments in community socio-economic services. PRADD II activities helped alleviate some of this income loss for targeted households; the largest benefits centered on women and areas with a stronger history of agriculture.

Some communities and agricultural associations have amplified their resources with PRADD II assistance. The evaluation finds evidence of maintenance and extension of food crops for women’s groups and beekeeping activities. Communities have been able to mobilize projects that have enabled them to develop infrastructure for their community. Agricultural organizations, especially women’s organizations, contribute to local infrastructures and make food donations to the community. On the other hand, some communities have abandoned alternative livelihood activities, such as fish farming and several entrepreneurial activities, and much of the cooperative model the project set up has disintegrated. The small enterprise development fund was also not sustainable.

The primary success factors of substitution activities, particularly women’s associations, are strong leadership and good governance, the ability to adapt to climatic hazards, the availability of members, and continued support and involvement from the National Rural Development Support Agency (ANADER) after PRADD II. Finally, subsistence activities have been more sustainable in areas where diamonds were not the main economic activity and in areas where the local population could learn from the influx of migrants with greater experience and expertise in agriculture.

See Figure 4 below for a high-level summary of the key outcome indicators for improved livelihoods.

Figure 4 : Outcomes for Improved Livelihood Indicators

Improved livelihoods	Livelihood outcomes for artisanal miners	Red
	Livelihood outcomes for local communities	Yellow
	Expansion of livelihood activities	Yellow

2.0 BACKGROUND

2.1 CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM

Côte d'Ivoire has been part of the development of mining activities since its accession to independence, including the production and export of diamonds from artisanal and small-scale mining. Mining activities serve to diversify the country's coffee- and cocoa-dominated export earnings sources.

Côte d'Ivoire's mining sector has experienced several key events since the country's independence. SODEMI was established in 1962, with a mandate to manage and implement Côte d'Ivoire's institutional and operational mining framework.

In 2002, to mark its desire to reduce the production of conflict diamonds, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire banned the production and export of diamonds. The diamond production areas of Séguéla and Tortiya, many of which the armed rebellion occupied, contributed to prolonged conflict due to the use of diamonds as a source of war funding, either through taxation or direct sales.

The KP is a global tripartite initiative between governments, civil society, and the diamond industry, launched in May 2000, under United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution 55/56. It aims to prevent the trade of "conflict diamonds" and to ensure that the trade in rough diamonds does not fund armed rebel groups. In 2003, Côte d'Ivoire joined the KP. In December 2005, the UN Security Council, following the recommendations of the KP, adopted resolution 1643 consecrating the embargo of the export and sale of diamonds produced in Côte d'Ivoire.

The Permanent Secretariat is the technical structure responsible for ensuring the application of the KPCS in Côte d'Ivoire. It was created in 2012² and tasked with the evaluation of the export of rough diamonds through certification of the legal and non-conflict origin of all rough diamonds leaving the Ivorian territory. In accordance with KP directives and the legislation in force, the Secretariat issues KP certificates, and prepares, updates, and validates all procedures relating to the production, trade, and export of rough diamonds.

In 2014, Côte d'Ivoire's efforts to comply with the minimum standards of the KP resulted in the lifting of the embargo on diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire³ by the UN Security Council. Since the embargo lifted, Côte d'Ivoire has implemented the KPCS by regularly evaluating and exporting batches of diamonds.

2.2 PRADD II

In view of the importance of the geological and mining potential of Côte d'Ivoire, USAID and the European Union jointly funded the PRADD II project in Côte d'Ivoire under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace managed by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments. By making the mining sector a major engine of economic growth, donors sought to promote stability and peace through post-crisis recovery.

Between 2013 and 2018, Tetra Tech implemented PRADD II⁴ under the auspices of the now USAID Land and Resource Governance Division (formerly Office of Land and Urban Development). The total project amount was approximately 2.3 million USD.

² Order n°0019 of May 18, 2012 of the Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy establishing the SPRPK-CI. This order was repealed by Interministerial Order No. 354 MIM/MPMMEF of September 27, 2013 on the creation, powers, organization and operation of the Permanent Secretariat of the Kimberley Process Representation.

³ Resolution 2153 of April 28, 2014.

⁴ PRADD II was implemented under Contract No. AID-OAA-I-12-00032/AIDOAA- TO-13-0004, of the Strengthening Tenure and Resource Rights (STARR) Indefinite Quantity Contract.

PRADD II worked at the local and national level. At the local level, Séguéla and Tortiya were the two project implementation sites. The Séguéla project site included the villages of Bobi, Sangana, Diaraana, Nieou, Duala, Soukoura, Dona, Diarabana, Oussougoula, Forona, Niongonon, and Masala-Asolo. The Tortiya project site included the villages of Katoron, Tienendiri, and Songolokaha. The main stakeholders were the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, SODEMI, local authorities, civil society actors, local communities, and artisanal miners.

The theory of change underpinning PRADD II was the following: “If property rights over land containing high-value natural resources are clarified and strengthened, conflicts over the control and benefits of these resources will be reduced, improved sector management and local-level investments in related livelihood activities will be increased.”

PRADD II's interventions were defined by three Activity streams that are the focus of this evaluation.

- **Activity 1:** Property Rights Clarification and Formalization
- **Activity 2:** Strengthening KPCS Compliance and ASM Governance
- **Activity 3:** Sustainable Economic Development in ASM Communities

2.2.1 ACTIVITY I: PROPERTY RIGHTS CLARIFICATION AND FORMALIZATION

In line with the Theory of Change, PRADD II rested on the hypothesis that clear and formal property rights leads to greater investment, better environmental management, and reduced conflict. The control of mining sites and the scarcity of land create competition among populations around land property rights. Boundary disagreements benefit informal workers and operators, with production that ends up on an informal market and income that escapes the cooperatives, SODEMI, and the State.

The program logic was that when artisanal miners' rights to prospect and dig for diamonds are formal and secure, they are more likely to sell through legal channels, enabling the government to track the origin of diamonds and prevent them from fueling conflict. Clarification and formalization of mining claims is expected to clarify the rules governing access, use, and transfer of rights for all relevant actors, including landowners, miners, and investors. It is also expected to clarify the rights to mining rent for local communities and therefore reduce any conflicts over mining rents. Finally, secure property rights are expected to create positive incentives for miners to be good stewards of land and resources.

PRADD II completed 64 out of 66 boundary segments and resolved 20 disputes. PRADD II also worked closely with the newly formed Rural Land Agency (*Agence foncière rurale*—AFOR) to support the procedures for territorial land certification and the Ministry of Agriculture to promote registration of cashew plantations in diamond mining areas.

Upon the completion of PRADD II project, project documentation notes the following main outputs for clarification and formalization of property rights:

- 17 mining cooperatives were registered and strengthened;
- Government services were trained and equipped to issue over 3,000 worker cards; and
- The project improved the self-financing capacities of the cooperatives; indicating progress towards higher incomes.

And the outputs for securing property rights:

- PRADD II supported the definition of community-driven land tenure activities, but also helped to integrate them into the country's legal and institutional systems. This included the establishment and

strengthening of the capacities of 39 village land management committees (*Comités villageois de gestion foncière–CVGFR*) ;

- The project supported the demarcation of the boundaries of 15 villages, completing 64 of the 66 boundary segments, to strengthen the control that communities exercise over their territory;
- The project supported the development of 10 village strategic development plans (SDP), and one rural township development plan; and
- The project contributed to the resolution of 20 conflicts in a context of land pressure. The lessons learned from these conflicts contributed to the national rural land policy and to the design of the technical intervention program of the new rural land agency (AFOR).

2.2.2 ACTIVITY 2: STRENGTHENING KPCS COMPLIANCE AND ASM GOVERNANCE

At the policy level, PRADD II supported governments to improve diamond mining legislation and regulations. In 2013, the project produced the Washington Declaration Diagnostic Framework, designed to help diamond-producing states translate international best mining practices into action. The Framework was endorsed by the KP in November 2013. In Côte d'Ivoire, PRADD II focused on helping the country re-enter the KPCS. At the national level, the PRADD II project worked closely with the KP Secretariat in Abidjan to apply the Washington Declaration Diagnostic Framework and establish various measures to assure compliance with KPCS requirements.

At the local level, PRADD II collaborated with the SODEMI parastatal mining company to strengthen the village cooperative model for ASM. This model involves the co-management of diamond mining between state and customary landowners whereby 12 percent of revenues are used for community development.

Prior to the PRADD II program, SODEMI and local communities had a very contentious relationship. There were disputes around subsurface and surface rights. Thus, the program spent significant effort on conflict resolution and relationship building between local communities, mining cooperatives, and SODEMI; this included the resolution of property rights disputes around ASM.

At the local level, PRADD II sought to strengthen the diamond value chain by designing alternative systems of financing, equipment, and marketing for the benefit of diggers, miners, intermediaries, and exporters. The program supported a number of Sustainable Mining by Artisanal Miners (SMARTER) mining training sites and provided mining equipment, including hand augers and semi-mechanized washers that were to support more efficient mining.

Additionally, PRADD II combined local, national, and international communication tools to mobilize civil society groups to induce behavioral change in artisanal miners and decision makers regarding the trade of rough diamonds. PRADD II used behavior change communication approaches to improve miners' perceptions of diamond trade and production.

Upon the completion of PRADD II project, project documentation notes the following main outputs:

- Contributing to registering 66 percent of exports in the KP chain of custody (highest proportion for ASM among KP countries);
- Supporting Côte d'Ivoire's participation in the 2015 diagnosis, which made defining the operational framework of the KP possible and contributed to partially lifting the sale suspension in Côte d'Ivoire;
- Launching communication campaigns that reached 4,117 people (26 percent women) and made it possible to increase basic KPCS knowledge among the diggers from 28 percent to 61 percent; and
- Supporting development of a KP procedures guide and an application for diamond valuation training.

2.2.3 ACTIVITY 3: SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ADSM COMMUNITIES

Artisanal miners labor under archaic and difficult working conditions and live in extreme poverty, often receiving less than five percent of the retail price of the stones they extract. Poverty is one obstacle that miners face in acquiring the licenses required to operate within the law, the equipment necessary to increase their gains, and the assets needed to diversify their livelihoods. Miners are often incentivized to quickly mine, sell, and move on to new sites. These practices have negative economic and environmental consequences, including reduced compliance with the KPCS and lower export revenues.

The PRADD II aimed at giving communities the tools to become more economically resilient. The program theory underlying alternative livelihood activities assumed that economic diversification was necessary because diamond production was declining. At the same time the diamond economy was declining, there was a boom in the price of cashews and gold that motivated the labor force to shift from diamonds into cashews and farming.

Thus, the project introduced complementary livelihoods, including the conversion of exhausted mining sites into agricultural units. The project specifically targeted women to encourage uptake of these livelihoods as a means of mitigating the environmental damages of artisanal mining while providing diversified income and food security. Local alternative livelihood interventions included livelihood diversification and environmental rehabilitation, as well as strategic development plans. Key alternative livelihood activities included beekeeping, fish farming, support for agricultural cooperatives, etc.

Upon the completion of PRADD II project, project documentation notes the following main outputs for improved livelihoods:

- About 1,000 households, 91 percent of them women-run, received technical, material, and organizational support for agriculture, producing nearly 89 tons of food crops and rehabilitating more than 15 hectares of farmed land. Overall, project beneficiary households, which represent 9 percent of all households in the intervention area, earned 73 percent more than nonbeneficiary households;
- Agricultural entrepreneurs received support, including approximately 40 beekeepers who produced 2 tons of honey, 50 fishponds, 22 women's groups, and 12 agricultural farms;
- The project developed a value chain approach to ensure greater sustainability of its interventions, through training and material support to 10 entrepreneurs, including one who produced chicken feed and another who ran a mining equipment rental business;
- More than 30 demonstration sites for SMARTER mining techniques received support; and
- Households and entrepreneurs improved their incomes, contributing to investments in community infrastructure for the benefit of the populations.

3.0 METHODOLOGY

The study examines a series of research questions and outcomes across the program logic with a focus on output sustainability across the three Activity streams described above.

Our four primary outcome areas of interest are:

- KPCS Compliance
- ASM Governance
- Secure Property Rights
- Improved Livelihoods

The evaluation seeks to determine the status of the program's technical and institutional interventions across each outcome. We examine the data to investigate whether investments remain and/or expanded, or whether they dissolved. The evaluation also sought to explain sustainability or lack of sustainability for project interventions.

To address these questions, the study methodology is based on original primary data collection and a comprehensive review of project reports. This evaluation is not part of a rigorous impact study in the sense of comparing two similar groups with a beneficiary group and a control group. Instead, content analysis of the semi-structured interviews with key actors combined with a document review and statistical analysis of the quantitative data made it possible to answer the evaluation questions. The quantitative survey data was collected and entered into CAPI Survey Solution and processed using Excel and STATA software. The statistical analysis focused on univariate and bivariate descriptive statistics to measure the sustainability of the project's achievements on the beneficiaries. Our primary research questions and indicators for each outcome question are delineated below.

KPCS Compliance

- What is the status of the KPCS Secretariat? Are they functioning and if so, how well? What challenges do they face?
- Did the KPCS chain of custody grow or collapse? How well is the chain of custody functioning? What steps are being taken to strengthen the chain of custody? If not functioning, when and why did it collapse?
- Primary indicators
 - Proportion of exports legally registered by year (2019–2021)
 - Reasons for chain of custody improvement or decline
 - Worker cards
 - KPCS knowledge among diggers
 - Use of legal diamond selling offices

ASM Governance

- What is the status of the relationship between SODEMI and local communities?
- How effective are local mining cooperatives functioning?
- Is there evidence of continued or increased investments in community infrastructure?

- Have there been investments in improved mining techniques/equipment (if still relevant in a context of active mining sites)?
- Is there evidence of improved environmental management? How effectively are rules and activities around environmental rehabilitation being implemented?
- What is the status of rehabilitated mined out sites? Have any other sites been rehabilitated since 2018? If yes, how much land has been rehabilitated, and what is the reclaimed land currently used for?
- How extensively are SMARTER mining techniques being employed in the study area? Is the mining equipment (hand augers, semi-mechanized washer) provided by PRADD II still being employed in the study area?
- Primary indicators
 - Status of relations between SODEMI and local communities
 - Mining site conflict
 - Functioning mining cooperatives
 - Investment in community infrastructure
 - Application of SMARTER mining techniques
 - The number of hectares of rehabilitated mining sites

Secure Property Rights (primary and secondary rights)

- Did the project interventions lead to more secure property rights, including security of land tenure for local communities, the rights of miners, and securing secondary rights for agricultural cooperatives?
- Did the program’s activities lead to a reduction in conflicts, including disputes related to community land and/or at mining sites?
- What is the status of land use planning? Have communities used the land use plans? If they have deviated/not used the plans, why not?
- Has there been broader uptake and investment of the land tenure activities that were community-driven, i.e., agricultural cooperative model?
- Are there cashew plantations in the village? If yes, have any of them been mapped? How many? Is there an “attestation de plantation” for these cashew plantations?
- For the cashew plantations mapped by PRADD II, what have been the results from having an “attestation de plantation”?
- Primary indicators
 - Perceived tenure security
 - Status of boundary conflicts
 - Land use planning

Improved Livelihoods

- Do we find evidence of improved livelihoods in communities that were supported by PRADD II?

- Are household livelihood activities still operating? (i.e., beekeeper activities, aquaculture, collective farms)
- Primary indicators
 - Livelihood outcomes for artisanal miners
 - Livelihood outcomes for local communities
 - Expansion of livelihood activities across the community

3.1 DATA SOURCES

The evaluation utilizes four major sources of information: project reports and documents, qualitative primary data (individual interviews and focus group), quantitative primary data (beneficiary survey), and direct observation (site visits).

For the field-based primary data collection, the study collected data from stakeholders at multiple levels (national, district, village, and household). The detailed data sources are listed in Table 1. The qualitative assessment tools included semi-structured interviews; key project stakeholders participated in focus group discussions at national and local levels.

At the national level, there were eight individual interviews with the following stakeholders: Ministry of Mines through the General Directorate of Mines and Geology, Permanent Secretariat of the Kimberley Process Representation, SODEMI, the former management of the Tetra Tech project, the Research and Advocacy Group on Extractive Industries, the NGO Indigo, and AFOR.

At the local level, there were eight individual semi-structured interviews in Séguéla and Tortiya with local officials from the Ministry of Mines, the Ministry of Agriculture, KP representation, local authorities (Prefect, Sub-Prefect, Municipal Council), SODEMI and the private sector (Collector).

The evaluation organized the 33 focus groups into different categories of project stakeholders: mining cooperatives, artisanal miners, women’s cooperatives, landowners, CVGFRs, and those involved in alternative livelihood diversification programs (cashew, beekeepers, agricultural collectives, etc.).

The quantitative data collected came from the survey conducted among village chiefs, heads of mining cooperatives, ASM, and beneficiary households of PRADD II. The survey used an electronic format on the CAPI Survey Solution application. A very short (15 minute) CAPI survey module was administered to respondents.

Based on random sampling, the planned sample size was 212, including 42 in Tortiya and 170 in Séguéla. This size represents 12 percent of the number of beneficiaries, which was 1,767 individuals, including 350 in the Tortiya area and 1,417 in the Séguéla area. At the end of the data collection phase, 188 beneficiaries out of 212 completed the survey, representing a completion rate of 88.7 percent. The completion rate according to the study areas is 76.2 percent for the Tortiya area (33 beneficiaries out of 42) and 91.8 percent for the Séguéla area (155 beneficiaries out of 170).

Direct observation included visits to the field sites to examine the equipment distributed, the sites of mining activities, and several alternative livelihood projects of project beneficiaries. Photos of visits to some sites are presented in the appendix.

For the secondary document review, the evaluation examines a number of project documents including: annual work plans, quarterly reports, the final report, USAID reports, and World Bank presentations.

3.2 DATA COLLECTION

A multidisciplinary team composed of evaluation experts, economists, sociologists and specialists in quantitative and qualitative surveys conducted the evaluation between October and December 2022.

Data collection took place at the central level in Abidjan and in the department of Séguéla and the sub-prefecture of Tortiya. Within the two main local sites, the selection of villages was based on those villages that received the largest number of interventions from PRADD II. Data collection occurred in the following localities:

- Séguéla with the villages of Diarabana, Oussougoula, Forona, Massala- Assolo, Niongonon, Siana, Wongué, Bobi, Sangana, Dualla, Sokoura and Dona; and
- Tortiya with the villages of Tenindieri and Kationron. Each locality used different types of data collection activities depending on information sources, as described in Table I.

Table I: Overview of Data Collection Approach

No.	Data collection sites	Individual interview	Focus group	Quantitative survey		
				Beneficiaries	village chiefs	ASM
1	Abidjan	8	-	-	-	-
2	Seguela	6	-	-	-	-
3	Diarabana	-	3	18	-	-
4	Oussougoula	-	3	11	1	1
5	Forona	-	-	6	1	1
6	Massala-Assolo	-	-	15	1	1
7	Niongonon	-	1	9	1	1
8	siana	-	-	-	-	-
9	wongue	-	-	20	-	-
10	Bobi	-	2	11	1	1
11	Sangana	-	-	24	1	1
12	Dualla	-	2	22	1	1
13	Sokoura	-	-	7	1	-
14	Dona	-	-	13	1	1
15	Tortiya	2	7	17	1	1
16	Tenindieri	1	2	9	1	-
17	Kationron	-	2	4	1	-
18	Natiemboro	-	-	2	1	-
TOTAL		17	22	188	13	9

4.0 FINDINGS - KPCS COMPLIANCE

The Permanent Secretariat of the Kimberley Process Representation in Côte d'Ivoire remains an active body, although it is functioning at a low level.

Since 2018, the Secretariat has achieved several goals related to improving the institutional framework for mining, control and monitoring of import-export activities, capacity building, and international cooperation. With regards to strengthening the institutional framework, the Secretariat has contributed to the creation of the Brigade for the Repression of Offenses against the Mining Code.⁵ The Secretariat supported the development of a framework for the rationalization of gold mining and the strengthening of the fight against the illicit exploitation of other mining substances and quarries. On June 1, 2021, the Government created the Special Group for the Repression of Illegal Gold Mining.⁶ The Secretariat supported the development and implementation of a new type of KP Certificate in 2019 for the export of rough diamonds. Since 2018, in terms of capacity building, the Secretariat continued training actions of its agents and stakeholders (police officers, border customs officers, etc.), donations of rough diamond valuation equipment and means of transportation (motorcycles), study trips and knowledge sharing experiences, and the creation of school sites in the major regions of the country.

The Secretariat also continued its commitment to international cooperation through engagement in a regional response to combat smuggling in the transaction of diamonds. With the technical support of the German Agency for International Cooperation, or GIZ, an action plan for 2020–2022 was developed and adopted to cover the implementation of the regional approach to the KP and ASM in the Mano River Union.

Finally, as part of reporting and accountability, the Secretariat prepared annual reports from 2018 to 2021 that presented their activities in accordance with the KP annual report guide.

Despite these achievements, the Secretariat faces significant challenges. The Secretariat's operating budget has decreased and is not always disbursed in a timely manner. Insufficient funding limits national and site-level interventions. As noted by a member of the Secretariat:

“The budget went from 100 million to 30 million (XOF) in 2018...This is the crux of the matter...all the administrations have the same concern, so I don't talk too much about that, but I want to point out that the Secretariat did a lot of work when the resources were available, but when the resources drastically dropped. It was difficult to repeat the same actions.”

As a result, the Secretariat can no longer regularly organize its statutory meetings. These meetings made it possible to discuss the state of progress of the activities and to address the challenges in a multisectoral framework. Also, although capacity building and institutional strengthening efforts have continued since 2018, the frequency of these events has been low.

Most significantly, the Secretariat has very little presence at the site level. Awareness-raising, communication, and exchange activities with actors in Séguéla and Tortiya are increasingly rare. Most actors in Séguéla and Tortiya only perceive and associate the activities of the KPCS with the activities carried out by the PRADD II project and do not “feel” the actions of the Secretariat.

⁵ Decree No. 2018-948 on the organization of the Ministry of Mines and Geology and Order No. 004/MMG/of October 22, 2018 of the Ministry of Mines and Geology specified the attributions, composition and missions of Brigade for the Repression of Offenses against the Mining Code.

⁶ The Special Group for the Repression of Illegal Gold Panning is made up of 560 elements, including 460 Gendarmes and 100 Water and Forestry agents specially equipped to intervene throughout the territory

In the opinion of the actors in the field, this situation does not reassure them about the functioning and effectiveness of the KP. As indicated by one respondent:

“We do not see the leaders of the Permanent Secretariat of the Kimberley Process, those with whom we could dialogue so that they carry the message to the State to carry out the reforms necessary to revitalize the activity. And given this fact, there is informal prospecting, informal exploitation, illegal sales, and therefore, the absence of control. If nothing is done in the long term, the compliance of Côte d’Ivoire’s Kimberley Process risks deteriorating.”

4.1 KPCS CHAIN OF CUSTODY

In Séguéla and Tortiya, diamond production has dropped considerably over the past five years. Figure 5 below shows the downward trend in diamond production since 2017⁷. According to site level survey data, only 44 percent of artisanal miners and 15 percent of landowners are “confident” about the probability of finding diamonds in their locality, particularly in Séguéla. According to those interviewed, the probability of finding diamonds over five carats is even lower.

Table 2: Perceived Likelihood of Finding Diamonds

COMMUNITY	ASM			LANDOWNERS		
	Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not confident	Very confident	Somewhat confident	Not confident
Seguela	37.50%	37.50%	25%	22.22%	44.44%	33.33%
Tortiya	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%
Total	44.44%	33.33%	22.22%	15.38%	61.54%	23.08%


Source: PRADD II, evaluation survey

The drop in production is explained by the “overcrowding” of alluvial sites, an absence of geological research to facilitate the discovery of new sites, and the institutional and technical inability to identify and mine new diamond producing zones.

The drop in diamond production has a significant effect on the KPCS chain of custody. In addition to a drop in the frequency of exports through buying offices, there has been a drop in requests and renewal of authorizations from purchasing offices, a drop in the number of collectors, and a lack of labor on diamond mining sites, as the workforce has shifted to agriculture and gold mining.

“The only problem we have is the scarcity of the product. There is a Kimberley Process because there is production of diamonds.” According to an anonymous informant.

Figure 5: Diamond Production Trends in Carats 2015-2021



⁷ Source: SPRPK-CI Annual Reports 2018-2021

The KPCS chain of custody risks collapsing in the medium to long term due to the decline in diamond production. The scarcity of diamonds contributes to an increase in informal mining, as production decline is associated with a perceived weakening in traceability. As indicated by an actor in the field:

“There is a black market parallel to the KP, there are a lot of informal collectors, there is an informal market, there are arrangements between the workers and the policeman. When the large stones are discovered, they are hidden and end up in another network where the worker has the possibility of selling the stone more expensive than if it were sold to the cooperative. It exists or the sales margins between the collector and the workers are so enormous that the temptation to circumvent the KP process is very high.”

This motivates illegal activities from “business collectors” who are beyond the control of SODEMI and the cooperatives, especially in Tortiya. Moreover, according to customary landowners, 46 percent of vendors in Tortiya are “*banabana*”; this rate is 22 percent according to ASM members.

The decrease in resources related to the purchase and renewal of mining licenses, along with the Secretariat ceasing field visits, are key obstacles to the availability of production notebooks and the process of distributing and renewing up-to-date mining licenses. At the end of the PRADD II project, the State had to include funds for the purchase and renewal of cards in the overall budget of the Secretariat to ensure the implementation of the KP on this component. The evaluation finds that miners are undertaking artisanal mining who do not have licenses and/or who have expired cards. Also, a significant proportion of artisanal miners do not know that possession of a permit is a prerequisite for diamond mining activity. Over the past 5 years, only 196 new cards have been issued, including 42 operator cards, 8 team leader cards, 134 worker cards, and 12 courier cards.⁸ As indicated by one respondent:

“He can have 20 or 30 workers, but they pay the card for a single worker, who is the one who covers all the other workers, so this part of the KP where it is said that all workers must have a card to access the site is not enforced and is not monitored. This also gives possibilities of diversion of diamond revenues.”

However, there has been some continuation of the Secretariat’s activities related to the certification system, which ensures the traceability of the diamond from its production to its sale in some local sites, including Diarabana and Bobi. It is possible to observe the remaining conformity to the KP process through completed production notebooks and the traceability from the notebooks to the identification of workers and operators on the plots. In certain sites, the process of selling diamonds to collectors is respected and recorded with the issuance of receipts that attest to the traceability of the diamond. The Secretariat surveys and records cooperatives’ productions.

The evaluation of diamonds has also continued, and the Secretariat has continued to train evaluators, which constitutes an added value for the certification system and for ensuring a fair purchase price of diamonds for producers. Exports are still done from Felix Houphouet-Boigny airport even if this phase was hampered during the border closure period due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.

Mining cooperatives remain aware of the need for traceability of their production, which favors the negotiation of prices and exports. As confirmed by a SODEMI manager:

“People know that when they have a production they have to be recorded, so that’s ingrained. They come every weekend to introduce us and record us in relation to the KP. The PRADD II has contributed to this good knowledge of the KP process by the cooperatives and to the understanding of the interest, for them, of ensuring the traceability of the diamond which allows them to benefit from the 12 percent of revenue.”

⁸ Secretariat 2018-2021 Annual Report Data Analysis

5.0 GOVERNANCE OF ARTISANAL AND SMALL-SCALE MINING

5.1 SODEMI AND LOCAL RELATIONS

The conformity of the KPCS process is closely linked to complementarity and synergy of action between SODEMI and the cooperatives. Traceability is linked to the capacity of SODEMI and the cooperatives to be able to monitor the actors who are on the plots. Cooperatives follow the various actors of the chain who work on the demarcated plots and subsequently inform SODEMI of diamond production. However, there has been a progressive deterioration of relations between SODEMI and the mining cooperatives. This constitutes a risk for compliance with the KPCS at the operational level.

There are divergent interests between SODEMI and local communities. There is a potential for higher gains for SODEMI from industrial exploitation due to shares and participation bonuses that are higher than the anticipated gains from artisanal mining (eight percent). SODEMI might seek to preserve sites for later industrial mining and therefore does not disseminate information on these explorations or potential sites. In contrast, local actors seek immediate access to sites. Cooperatives wish to increase their income to compensate for the low productivity of the current alluvial sites and presence of informal mining on the ground.

At present, SODEMI prohibits digging deeper given the provisions of the mining code in this area; however, it is not very active in identifying new sites. Local respondents even report a suspicion that SODEMI is “hiding” information on the potential of certain sites. There is an asymmetry of information about potential sites due to the absence of reports and publications relating to the results of site research and exploration. As indicated by an actor during the interviews:

“Information on the various promising sites was disclosed during the crisis of 2002, which enabled the rebellion to be able to attack the various kimberlites. With this experience, the communication on the results of the explorations are kept secret by the Directors and left to the discretion of the State.”

The asymmetry of information concerning new sites presents a risk to collaboration and trust between the two entities. The exasperation of artisanal miners is reflected in the following:

“Today the diamond is the dyke that we have been asking for for years. SODEMI did not want to deliver this dyke, often it speaks to us in terms of status, we are artisanal, we must be semi-industrial, sometimes they tell us that it (the dyke) is reserved for industries whereas we know that the reserve that is there cannot make the industry.”

In line with this, there is a general perception among local communities and cooperatives that SODEMI only grants permits on alluvial sites that are already overexploited and very depleted. A participant noted that “SODEMI always sends us to the same sites.”⁹

Thus, in contrast to the prescribed KP prospecting process, communities—and not SODEMI—appear to be at the forefront of prospecting. The prescribed process calls for prospecting to come upstream from SODEMI who subsequently grants plots to the cooperatives. However, the evaluation finds that communities prospect through observation or local social networks that spread information about informal activities of clandestine workers or the discovery of stones by members of the community in their daily activities. Local actors, including representatives from mining cooperatives, expressed doubts

⁹ In addition, most of the areas have already been colonized by plantations (in Séguéla in particular). Therefore, even if SODEMI discovered exploitable sites, there would be a risk of conflicts due to the lack of a compensation mechanism for the resulting plantation damage.

that SODEMI is conducting the “right” prospecting in the right places, with a general opinion that SODEMI simply observes the results of informal prospecting approaches developed by the communities themselves. Despite a weakening of relations and the scarcity of diamonds, there are generally cordial relations between SODEMI and local communities. According to one SODEMI expert:

“We don’t have a problem with anyone here, even with the cooperative societies, it’s true that there are gnashing of teeth but there have always been good relations between us...all palaver is because the diamond does not come out. If the government authorizes us, SODEMI is on board”....

The evaluation finds that SODEMI and mining cooperatives meet, at minimum, on an annual basis in Séguéla where some level of production continues. Once a mining site is discovered, SODEMI is fully involved in the production process. The functioning mining cooperatives confirmed that SODEMI is involved in the management of sites, and community leaders in areas of active diamond production confirmed that they obtain authorization for site exploitation from SODEMI.

Furthermore, SODEMI, aware of the crisis of confidence with local communities, noted initiatives aimed to restore its image and strengthen local relations. This is through continued meetings and formal engagements with local stakeholders, along with donations of materials and equipment, including tricycles to cooperatives and bench tables to schools. In line with this, the survey results show that eight of the 13 Customary landowners in the study area (all in Séguéla) reported meeting or speaking with a representative from SODEMI in the past 12 months, and 9 of the 13 CLOs noted that their opinion would be taken seriously by SODEMI.

Table 3: Relations Between SODEMI and CLOs

		SEQUELA	TORTIYA	TOTAL
Over the last 12 months, did you speak with a representative of SODEMI?	Yes	77.78	25.00	61.54
	No	22.22	75.00	38.46
Is your view taken into account by SODEMI?	Yes	88.89	25.00	69.23
	No	11.11	75.00	30.77
Have you participated in a meeting or have any support from SODEMI?	Yes	77.78	25.00	61.54
	No	22.22	75.00	38.46

None of the CLOs reported that their community suffered negative effects due to the presence of SODEMI, however, only two of the thirteen noted that their community has benefited from support by SODEMI, and this was through support to local schools.

5.2 OPERATION OF MINING COOPERATIVES

PRADD II supported the formation and strengthening of 16 cooperatives. Cooperatives are an essential element for maintaining traceability and the viability at the KP’s chain of custody. The evaluation found that of the 16 cooperatives, only four are currently functional because of the collapse in the diamond economy. These functional cooperatives are those where diamond production has been carried out in the last two years (2021 and 2022), including Bobi, Dualla, Oussougoula, and Diarabana.

An informant noted that “...there is no production, so there are a lot of cooperatives that have not had any activities for a long time”.

Five years after the end of the PRADD II, these four cooperatives are still active, although the low levels of diamond production undermine their effectiveness. These cooperatives maintain production notebooks, carry out the public sale of diamonds, implement monitoring and control mechanisms on the authorized sites, and maintain diamond evaluation equipment. Their knowledge of exploitation

techniques seems intact, even if the application is sporadic. The process of selling diamonds to collectors involves the use of receipts that support the traceability of the diamond. As noted above, mining licenses are generally not issued or renewed, although they are checked and used on the plots in operation.

Assessments of who is the most important decision maker for ASM and how well ASM is managed in the community varies by site. In Séguéla, the mining cooperatives remain the primary actor, followed by the village chief. In Tortiya, the three decision-makers are customary landowners, village chiefs, and the Regional Directorate of Mines. Correspondingly, in Séguéla, eight of nine community leaders agree or strongly agree that ASM is well managed and that ASM rules are effectively enforced, while in Tortiya they disagree or do not know.

Mining cooperatives face many challenges to effectiveness and sustainability. The primary challenge is the scarcity of diamonds¹⁰ and, by extension, a dwindling mining workforce. Most of the mining labor force has been attracted to gold mining, creating a shortage of labor for the prospecting and exploitation of diamond sites. Also, the absence of strong leadership in some communities' limits initiatives for the development of the plots. In Tortiya, PRADD II organized the artisanal miners, however, the mining cooperative was unable to develop a plot granted by SODEMI because of the high operating cost¹¹. While cooperatives express the need for semi-industrial techniques, provisions of the mining code restrict these methods for artisanal mining.

5.2.1 IMPROVED MINING TECHNIQUES

The evaluation finds that cooperatives have reverted to unsuitable production techniques since the end of PRADD II. There is little evidence of the use of improved mining techniques, along with the continued use of traditional mining tools.

PRADD II initiated training sessions with a view to adopting improved ASM techniques, such as the trenching method and construction of panels. PRADD II also provided cooperatives with equipment to improve productivity while helping to preserve the environment, alleviate the hardship of work, and reduce the risk of accidents, including tricycles, motor pumps, and mobile washing machines. All cooperative leaders in Séguéla and Tortiya were aware of these activities.

In practice, the trenching method seems to be gradually being abandoned for the circular method because “they don’t have time,” even though 78 percent of the cooperatives questioned claim to have used the method at least once. SODEMI continues to use augers in Séguéla on a few sites at the request of the cooperatives, however, the use of modern equipment by the cooperatives remains limited. Equipment include pickaxes, shovels, buckets, which are still rudimentary.

The decline in the use of improved methods and materials is due to several factors. First, miners report that the trenching method “takes too long,” and similarly, perceive the use of certain equipment (auger, mobile washing) as time-consuming. Second, SODEMI, lacks the resources to provide additional equipment to support recommended techniques. Third, high maintenance costs in a context of diamond scarcity and low capacity of cooperatives reduce the potential for maintenance and repair of worn-out equipment. Finally, some equipment that PRADD II provided was reported to be in poor working order (e.g. mobile washing machine) and did not meet the needs of miners, as illustrated by one respondent:

¹⁰ Diamonds are increasingly only found at deep levels, which are difficult or impossible to achieve through artisanal mining techniques. It takes a long time to reach these depths through artisanal mining (up to six months to reach the ore) and in the event of rain, the work is delayed and has to be resumed. This leads to an additional cost and/or a loss of investment, which sometimes causes the abandonment of the activity.

¹¹ Moreover, most of the members, made up of former SAREMCI employees, are reluctant to integrate new people into their office.

“Mobile washing, no, it did not work, ... since, each time when we went to wash, there were too many breakdowns. It’s not like the old washing machines.”

5.3 REHABILITATION OF MINING SITES

PRADD II placed an emphasis on the rehabilitation of mined-out sites to prevent accidents and restore the environment. All stakeholders affirm that there are site rehabilitation rules, and certain stakeholders highlighted specific instances of rehabilitation. According to one SODEMI agent, “After the project, ... they closed a lot of holes... and that was in collaboration with the supervisors in the field...and the field is even usable.”

However, there are a greater number of sites that have not been rehabilitated in the PRADD II study area. There is general non-compliance with PRADD II techniques and procedures in formal sites. Second, there is a large amount of informal mining and corresponding levels of unrestored sites in the study areas. Rehabilitation according to the techniques and procedures taught by PRADD II is only respected on plots in operation according to the KP process, under the control of SODEMI.¹² The main reason cited for not restoring mined-out sites is that it takes too much time and effort.

Table 4: Perceived Rules for Mined-out Land Rehabilitation

ARE THERE RULES IN THIS VILLAGE THAT REQUIRE RESTORING MINED OUT SITES?				
		SÉGUÉLA	TORTIYA	TOTAL
ASM	Yes	25%	0%	22.22%
	No	75%	100%	77.78%
CLOs	Yes	33.33%	0%	23.08%
	No	66.67%	100%	76.92%
Households	Yes	18.06%	6.06%	15.96%
	No	81.94%	93.94%	84.04%

Six of thirteen interviewed customary landowners report that there are no rules in their villages that require the restoration of mined-out sites and only five customary landowners report that anyone in their village have participated in site rehabilitation, since 2013. Although all leaders report that mining site restoration is important and all but one customary landowner report that mining causes problems for rivers, forests, and agricultural land, in the past five years, all but two customary leaders from the study villages report that pits have ‘never’ been closed in their village. Only one-third of the cooperative members surveyed said that they (or their family members) had participated in rehabilitation activities and, only a marginal portion of the inhabitants of the communities visited are aware of the existence of rehabilitation procedures (see Table 4): community leaders (23 percent), cooperative leaders (22 percent), and households (15 percent).

¹² One circumstance supporting mining site restoration is site rehabilitation as a response to land pressure. Agriculture—mainly cash crops (cashew)—is the primary substitution activity for the significant drop in diamond production. Although, in these circumstances rehabilitation is completed with the means on board, without a precise rule. This includes throwing in tree trunks, branches, and garbage to prevent people and livestock from falling into old sites.

6.0 SECURING PROPERTY RIGHTS

6.1 TENURE SECURITY

PRADD II supported community-driven land tenure activities and helped to integrate them into the country's legal and institutional systems. This included the establishment and strengthening of the capacities of 39 CVGFR.

A CVGFR was established in the 13 communities covered by the performance evaluation. The evaluation finds that the CVGFRs are functioning in seven of the thirteen study communities; in Tortiya, no CVGFRs are working, whereas seven out of nine are working in Seguela. Where functioning, community leaders judge that the CVGFR is functioning at a relatively high level.

Although none of the CLOs report having formal documentation for customary land, 11 of the 13 community leaders reported that the boundaries of their customary land are clear, and all but one reported that village land cannot be taken or used without permission.

Similarly, 87 percent of household respondents agree that customary land boundaries are clear, and 92 percent note that it is impossible or unlikely that someone will use customary land without authorization. We do not have baseline indicators for these measures and therefore cannot assess change over time. However, five years post-project, the evaluation indicates that leaders and the population report a high degree of perceived tenure security in and Tortiya. Although the absolute level is high, Tortiya is slightly more insecure compared to .

6.2 DELIMITATION

The issue of demarcation and control of mining rent is still topical in the localities visited. Within the framework of the PRADD II project, the demarcation of the boundaries of village territories covered 15 villages, including 12 villages in the department of Séguéla and 3 villages in the department of Niakara.

According to AFOR, out of the 15 villages, 11 villages have been delimited and have obtained delimitation decrees, including 8 in the department of and all 3 villages of the Sub-Prefecture of Tortiya. According to AFOR, this success rate can be explained by the good understanding and cooperation of the populations of the various villages concerned. Furthermore, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development continued land demarcation through a different project for two more villages based on the approach developed by PRADD II. This included the delimitation of a section between Bobi and Forona, carried out in 2021 that utilized the PRADD II methodology.

Table 5: Perceived Quality of Village Boundaries Demarcation

THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CUSTOMARY LAND OF MY VILLAGE ARE:	ASM (%)	COMMUNITY LEADERS (%)
Very clear	55.56	53.85
Clear	44.44	38.46
Not clear	0	7.69

However, for only slightly more than half of land chiefs (53 percent), village boundaries are very clearly defined and only 38 percent believe that the demarcations between villages are clarified (see Table 5). The delimitation remains unfinished between certain villages in , in particular in the case of an ongoing land conflict between Diarabana and Niongonon. Claims for certain spaces, particularly mining, continue to fuel tensions around delimitation. For some actors and villages, the delimitation has been a positive factor in guaranteeing property rights; however, for Diarabana, the locals perceive delimitation as a process that dispossess them of the rights to control certain areas and calls into question their limits in favor of Bobi, Niongonon. In Tortiya, the idea of delimitation in Natiemboro is not accepted.

Village authorities and agricultural cooperatives maintain their agreements to access agricultural lands although the populations do not have documents attesting to their right to the land under cultivation. And, like agricultural cooperatives, beekeepers and cashew producers continue to exploit the land where their activities are located, although without documents.

“I don’t have a document proving that it’s for me, so if the government or a company needs my land, I know it’s up to them, eh, because I don’t have a document...otherwise in general all the fields that are here none have an official document on it.”

The evaluation does not have a sense of the substance and extent of the "baseline" conflict levels or resolution mechanisms prior to PRADD II. However, with regards to disputes, we find evidence that conflicts have declined in the area. According to 11 of 13 customary landowners, the frequency of disputes over land has decreased, while two respondents note that it has stayed the same. Twelve of thirteen report that the intensity of conflicts related to mining in the village has decreased. Given the low levels of diamond production, it is not possible to attribute the reduced conflicts to delimitation activities versus the scarcity of diamonds that motivate conflict. Nevertheless, there is an indication of the sustainability of PRADD II’s border conflict resolution mechanisms. This remaining “culture of consultation” and dialogue is noted by the NGO Indigo and community leaders. Within the context of a more recent project, a respondent from Indigo noted that:

“...we even used people from Séguéla to share their experience in other contexts. We took Diarabana people, they went to Sinfra to share their experiences, they went west, they went to the Sinfra area.”

6.2.1 CASHEW PLANTATION MAPPING

Correspondingly, no one has complied with the mapping of cashew plantations and the process of obtaining a plantation certificate. Awareness-raising actions have been carried out by the Departmental Directorate of MINADER aimed at encouraging the populations to follow the procedures for obtaining a certificate of plantation of cashew trees. However, the mapping of cashew plantations is ineffective due to low demand from the population. Low interest in this initiative is driven by high costs and the prevalence of customary rights and land management, which are reported to effectively manage land without a need for documentation. According to a focus group of cashew nut producers and beekeepers’ cooperative in Tortiya: “There are landowners, they initiated quotas...me, at home every year, I pay rights to the people of Natiénboro...every year, I pay them 30,000 XOF we give them that and then we are safe.”

6.3 STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT PLANS

The project developed SDPs according to a participatory approach with the local population. The underlying assumption was that the SDPs would form the basis for consensual management of land use and exploitation of local economic opportunities. However, there is no evidence of impact and little sustainability of strategic development plans. Except for Diarabana, most of the beneficiary villages of PRADD II do not follow the SDP in their development process.

The viability of this project component was challenged by mining rent and political manipulation. In Tortiya, for example, the current Municipal Council is reluctant to orient its development actions on the SDP because the previous Municipal Council developed the plan. Authorizing the implementation of the SDP would legitimize the past council.

On the other hand, in Diarabana (Séguéla), the community leaders proceed with the construction of community infrastructure according to their SDP. The adoption of the plan was facilitated in Diarabana because (1) it was a means of improving livelihoods and (2) Diarabana is one of the few areas where diamond production is relatively regular, thus making it possible to collect common resources for the development of local infrastructure.

7.0 IMPROVED LIVELIHOODS

PRADD II intended to guide communities becoming more economically resilient to cope with declines in diamond production and income and take advantage of the opportunities presented by high prices for certain agricultural products. The project therefore supported the conversion of depleted mining sites into agricultural units for livelihood diversification (cashew and fish production, beekeeping, diversification of women's income sources). The project specifically targeted women to encourage the adoption of these livelihoods as a means of mitigating the environmental damage caused by artisanal mining while providing diversified income and food security. The project also support young entrepreneurs through a small enterprise development fund and entrepreneurship competitions.

Five years after project closure, the evaluation finds variation in the success of alternative livelihood activities. There are some remaining positive outcomes from livelihood diversification activities, although the positive effects of economic diversification activities are not widespread. Among the activities that the PRADD II program supported, customary landowners (CLO) report that households continue to practice and, in some cases, have expanded beekeeping, bird breeding, cashew nut processing, and women's agricultural associations. Beekeeping and women's associations have been the most successful and sustainable.

In contrast, beneficiaries have abandoned some activities, including a mill, fish farms, agricultural cooperatives, as well as some of the 'young entrepreneur' enterprises such as yogurt production and agouti breeding¹³. In these cases, citizens did not derive substantial benefit in terms of income, particularly in agricultural (cashew) and fish farming activities. Combined with the current inflation of food products, they have, for the most part, felt a decline in their quality of life. Since the diamond activity is mainly the work of men, the drop in production leads to a drop in their main sources of income.

Areas of success include the maintenance and even the extension of beekeeping activities, particularly in Tortiya and Oussougoula. Although at a level lower than that from the diamond activity, beekeeping continues to provide income and contributes to meeting basic needs. In these localities, there is some evidence of an increase in the number of members and greater production. Beekeepers from Katoron, Ténindiéri and Tortiya have formed a cooperative. Katoron members produce at Katoron and sell their produce through the cooperative. The cooperative supplies the smoker and helps all members extract the honey. And the Miel de Tortiya cooperative has grown from 10 to 20 active members, with production also rising from 502.5 kg to 2177 kg. Further, demand for honey is high, and more and more people are interested in this activity. Training is available locally and the cooperative provides the smoker, but the cost of inputs (suits) is a barrier for expansion.

According to the beekeepers interviewed, it appears that this good dynamic is explained by the significant profits that honey production represents. There is a strong demand on the market. As stipulated during the focus group with the beekeepers of Tortiya: "Currently, I think that honey is more profitable than a cashew field...It's obvious, huh! If we invest in honey, it will boost."

Despite this example of success, other respondents note the low productivity of their activities and rise in price of inputs that reduces the potential for activity expansion. The enterprise development fund was not sustainable and entrepreneurship competitions are no longer held. Beneficiaries have ended up abandoning other activities, especially fish farming. According to a SODEMI official: "I don't know if it

works in the other villages, but in Diarabana people get ‘it’s dead’ as soon as the project left for a year, they gave up.”

Several factors explain these results. First, local communities in the study area are not familiar with aquaculture activities, as they are historically oriented towards agriculture and animal husbandry. This leads to more problems and complications, combined with increased likelihood of abandoning activities when encountering difficulties. Second, ponds dried up due to “leakage” of water due to people digging for diamonds. Climate change also played a role since fish farming relies on an abundant water source and rainfall patterns have changed in the area. Also, there was simply no demand for some activities such as yogurt production. Finally, respondents noted other contributing factors that might have been in the purview of the project to address include the poor management of inputs, the lack of proper equipment, and the initial selection of unsuitable sites. For example, agouti breeding was hampered by the death of the agoutis received under the project. The conditions under which the agoutis were received, and the number of males and females needed for mating, made it difficult to maintain the activity.

7.1 SUPPORT FOR ENTREPRENEURS

Entrepreneurship competitions are no longer held. However, there are local initiatives that reflect young people's interest in entrepreneurship. In Katoron, Tortiya and Seguéla (Oussougoula), young beekeeping entrepreneurs are investing more in their activity by installing new hives to increase production.

The sustainability of the small enterprise development fund was challenged by the business environment. Local representations of Ministries posed problems. For example, the Ministry of Commerce required the option of a license for commercial activity; the Ministry of Animal Production required certification for animal feed; and the tax authorities demanded immediate payment of taxes for these newly-created start-ups. Further, PRADD II was supported by the Dutch NGO SPARK, but the staff lack someone with expertise in business who could have empowered small business with appropriate management skills. Even though PRADD II supported small business with small grants to finance their businesses, the evaluation did not find existence of small enterprise development fund, and young entrepreneurs continue to ask for capital to extend their activities.

7.2 WOMEN’S ASSOCIATIONS

PRADD II activities supported the emergence of structured professional agricultural associations or organizations with relatively transparent and efficient internal governance systems, particularly among women. In most villages, there has been a collapse in the cooperative model with the dissolution of functioning of most groups/cooperatives. However, like the livelihood diversification results described above, we find some pockets of success among women’s groups.

All 13 customary landowners in study villages report that PRADD II supported the creation of women’s groups in their village. Eight (five in Séguéla and three in Tortiya) report that the group is still functioning. For those eight that still function, one functions at an “excellent” level and seven function “well.” The non-functioning ones either collapsed soon after the close of PRADD II or approximately two years after the end of the project. They are reported to have stopped because of product collapse, lack of leadership, and/or equipment that did not work.

The agricultural activities of the women’s associations have expanded. Several cases of success can be highlighted for food production. Women's agricultural groups in Tortiya (Tortiya and Tenindieri) and Séguéla (Bobi) are continuing their farming activities. They have diversified their crops and increased the number of plots under cultivation. For example, the Tenindiéri women's group has extended its

cultivated plots, diversified crops, and acquired plots to build a store for the association. An FGD with the association indicated a harvest of 75kg of rice last year. The group has also invested in rental equipment. Also, in Tortiya, the Fotemogoban group was decorated on Independence Day for its contribution to food self-sufficiency through rice production. To date, the women of this group cultivate 7 hectares of rice, in addition to market garden crops.

The women's agricultural cooperatives in Bobi highlight sustainability in food crops production for consumption and household income. In Diarabana and Bobi, women continue to work on the common plot through continued support from ANADER within the framework of a project, to produce market gardening and rice. Income from sales is used for children's education expenses and a solidarity fund which grants loans to members that are repaid at harvest. Women in this cooperative have been able to increase their production, and in addition to their site, they have set up a five-hectare site near the dam for the cultivation of rice and market gardening. They have cattle (four oxen) to plow the land, which is also rented by the cooperative. They have also benefited from a tricycle that takes the women to their plot and transports their production. Through ANADER, in 2022, the cooperative has benefited from rice seed, market gardening, and fertilizer.

Agricultural resources from these associations and organizations have been used to finance some community infrastructure, although not at the level experienced before the collapse of the diamond economy. For example, in Tienindéri, women's agricultural organizations help finance school construction, and in Bobi, women rice farmers donate rice to the school canteen. According to the actors interviewed, factors supporting success of the associations include: the leadership of the members, the ability to adapt to climatic hazards, "good governance", the availability of members for labor, and the supervision of ANADER. Also, since diamond production is not the main activity of women, they have shown enthusiasm and additional motivation to carry out commercial activities related to agricultural production, especially food. This process, although hampered at times by crop damage by animals or disease attributed to insect pests, has contributed to improving the livelihoods of women and local communities in Tortiya, Tenindieri, Bobi, and Diarabana.

Overall, subsistence activities seem to have more sustainability in areas where diamonds were not the main economic activity. In these areas, the agricultural economy was already experiencing relatively significant developments with export products such as cotton and cashew. The populations, in particular the women, already had skills and practices that allowed them to overcome the challenges linked to the agricultural activities.

On the other hand, in areas where diamond mining was the main economic activity, agricultural production was still considered a subsidiary activity that the population did not approach with significant interest. Indeed, at least in Seguela, all CLOs note that ASM has had positive impacts on their community, mainly through school construction and mosques. In contrast, in Tortiya, ASM's effect is rated as negative or "unknown." As indicated by one respondent:

"If you take Tiéndieri and others, the mining activity was not sufficiently present, it was rather the production of cotton, cashew and therefore when we came with market gardening and food products and we saw the motivation of the women. It worked. While on the other side, when we stuck to the idea of the diamond, it was the diamond that generated a lot of resources and we are not always used to carrying out other activities."

Consequently, migration is another factor that explains the success or failure of the livelihood activities implemented by PRADD II five years after the end of the project. Localities with high migration have a greater relative success in the implementation of agricultural activities because it brings in a workforce with more agricultural knowledge.

8.0 CONCLUSION

This performance evaluation examines outcomes and sustainability for KPCS Compliance, ASM Governance, Security of Property Rights, and Livelihood outcomes and sustainability five years after the end of PRADD II. Since PRADD II in Côte d'Ivoire was not subject to a prospective performance or impact evaluation, we do not have baseline data or a research design that enables the evaluation of PRADD II treatment sites relative to comparison sites. The first takeaway from this evaluation is that the final performance evaluation would have been significantly improved if baseline data for a prospective performance evaluation had been collected. In cases where an impact evaluation is not feasible, there are limited research funds, and/or comparison sites cannot be identified, it is still very beneficial to collect baseline data on relevant indicators in treatment sites. This can be done in a cost-effective manner and will greatly enhance the quality of endline sustainability and performance reports.

The KP process continues to function at the national level and weakly in Seguela; it has generally collapsed in Tortiya. The weaknesses and challenges identified in the KP process include the prevalence of informal mining and lack of renewal and use of mining licenses. The Permanent Secretariat continues to function at a reduced level at the national level and although field missions continue, they are increasingly rare and irregular which erodes confidence in the KP system.

The poor state of the KP process is primarily driven by the collapse of the diamond economy. However, given the continued functioning of the Secretariat and established knowledge of the KP process among functioning mining cooperatives, it is reasonable to assume that PRADD II's institutional strengthening and capacity building efforts helped to ensure that the KP process continues to function, albeit at a low level.

Although limited, there is evidence of sustainability of PRADD II's governance work. There are some positive outcomes from institutional strengthening and capacity building with mining cooperatives. Most mining cooperatives are no longer functioning because of the collapse in diamond production; the functioning cooperatives continue to implement the KPCS process, and miners and community leaders report that cooperatives are the primary managers and decision-makers for ASM. SODEMI continues to meet and coordinate with local cooperatives and local communities. Respondents report that ASM is well-managed and mining disputes are reported to have decreased significantly in the past five years.

The evaluation finds little to no sustainability of mining site rehabilitation and the use of SMARTER mining techniques. Respondents noted that these take too much effort or too much time and they see little to no benefit from the extra work. There are no enforcement mechanisms to ensure that traditional and/or harmful methods are discontinued. In similar mining contexts, these interventions may face similar levels of failure, as beneficiaries do not perceive benefits or incentives to switch to more difficult and time-consuming behaviors.

The scarcity of diamonds and dwindling presence of the Secretariat in the field severely threaten the long-term viability of cooperatives. Deteriorating relations between SODEMI and local communities presents a significant risk to future KP sustainability. Problems of identifying future production sites, especially as these might be at deeper levels than what local cooperatives can safely and legally access through artisanal and semi-mechanized findings, exacerbate the deteriorating relations. If industrial mining moves forward, SODEMI, local communities, and mining cooperatives will further test the conflict resolution mechanisms that PRADD II established. Industrial mining has the potential to reduce local livelihoods by lowering local actors' access income from diamond production and reducing the availability of agricultural land for cashews and crops.

At the local level, PRADD II focused on boundary demarcation, conflict reduction, and community level land certification versus individual level land titling for 15 communities in Séguéla and Tortiya, given legal

complexities around individual titling. Villages report feeling secure (although at a lower level in Tortiya) and having a decreasing number of disputes over the past five years. These are positive signs of PRADD II's influence in the area, although the study design limits a high level of confidence in attribution to the project. Also, since production and disputes over diamond resources is low, it is difficult for the evaluation to determine whether the delimitation improved the capacity of mining cooperatives and local leaders to claim and distribute benefits from mining rents on formal plots to their communities.

Despite delimitation and efforts to strengthen local property rights, informal mining activities continue. Moreover, local concern about SODEMI's plans for industrial mining and how that might require the appropriation of agricultural lands that are currently cultivated for cashew farms will further test the efficacy of PRADD II's delimitation and dispute resolution model.

The evaluation finds no evidence of sustainability for land use planning through strategic development plans or certification of cashew plantations for mapping. These activities appear to have collapsed relatively soon after the end of PRADD II. Respondents note that there is no need for cashew farm maps because local customary authorities are effectively managing agricultural land in the area. A lack of engagement with the strategic plans developed by the program could be driven by the lack of commitment by leaders, including a lack of incentives to engage in extra work, and lack of diamond production to provide financial support for the planned infrastructure.

There are several key takeaways about the livelihood effects from PRADD II. There is some evidence that specific household beneficiaries and a few women's groups from PRADD II have made the most of diversification activities and have minimized the negative consequences of declining diamond production. However, we do not find widespread livelihood improvements from PRADD II for communities and miners. Although still occurring, the contributions to community well-being are very small and not sufficient to drive meaningful socio-economic development or poverty reduction.

Results are more visible and sustainable among women and areas that were less dependent on mining. Beekeeping has been relatively profitable and sustainable for a handful of household beneficiaries, whereas fish-farming quickly collapsed after PRADD II's end. Benefits did not accrue to the primary targeted beneficiaries: miners and mining communities. The failure of collectives, women's groups, and entrepreneurial activities is attributed to a lack of leadership, poor management, and difficulty of the activities, especially for communities that have little agricultural background.

The lack of anticipated effects for diversification interventions cannot be linked to collapse of the diamond economy. Indeed, given the scarcity of diamonds, one might have expected a greater uptake in alternative livelihoods. However, despite low production and low confidence in finding future diamonds, the culture of diamond mining is deeply entrenched in the study area. Almost all miners and half of customary leaders interviewed reported that mining will continue next season, even if no diamonds are found this season.

In summary, the evaluation finds some evidence of positive effects and sustainability for institutional strengthening and capacity building around KPCS compliance, securing property rights, and ASM governance. There is also evidence of improvements from alternative livelihood diversification—mainly beekeeping—for a small number of beneficiaries, and several women's agricultural cooperatives continue to function and have expanded operations. In the case of KPCS and ASM governance, a lack of impact or sustainability is driven, in part, by the collapse of diamond production. However, there are also a few unsustainable and/or low impact interventions (i.e., certain alternative livelihood activities, land-use planning, cashew mapping, site rehabilitation, and SMARTER mining techniques) that should receive additional consideration during the design of ASM programming.

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APPENDIX 2: SELECTED IMAGES OF SITE VISITS



Photo 1: Beekeepers in Tortiya



Photo 2: Cashew nut processing business



Photo 3: Focus group with cooperatives in Bobi



Photo 4: Focus group with cooperatives in Diarrabana

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