

## Land Markets and Alternative Production Models

**Presenter: Mike Roth** 

Best Practices for Land Tenure and Natural Resource Governance in Africa Monrovia, Liberia October 2012

## Policy Domain—Land Reform to Consolidation

Problem	Examples
Break-up of Large Scale Holdings	<ul> <li>Land and agrarian reform in Southern Africa</li> <li>Privatization and farm restructuring in Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union</li> <li>Break up of State farms/landholdings</li> </ul>
Management of Common Pool Resources	<ul> <li>Management of fauna and wildlife in Kenya, Namibia and South Africa</li> <li>Certain farm worker equity share schemes in South Africa</li> </ul>
Consolidation/ Management of Small Fragmented Landholdings	<ul> <li>Small holders leasing out land to private investors, Ethiopia</li> <li>Land use consolidation, Rwanda</li> <li>Linking small holders with investors, Mozambique, Angola</li> </ul>

## **Alternative Tenure Forms**

Ownership	Tenure Models
Individual	<ul> <li>Freehold property</li> <li>Leasehold property</li> <li>Rental/sharecropping</li> <li>Customary Land Tenure</li> <li>Contract Farming</li> <li>Trusts/Conservancies</li> </ul>
Group	<ul> <li>Common Property Associations/Community Demarcations</li> <li>Community Based NRM</li> <li>Agricultural Production Cooperative (APC)</li> <li>Conservancies/Trusts</li> <li>Company</li> <li>Equity Sharing Model</li> </ul>
State	Co-management

## **Model Challenges**

- 1. Incentivized Owners/Workers Incentives to work the land; ability to monitor and supervise labor
- Capital Intensity Capital is mobile; voting rights and dividends are proportional to investment; land and assets serviceable as collateral; credit available
- Economies of Scale Ability to manage lumpy inputs; net income/ha increases with landholding size
- Market Coordination horizontal, upstream, downstream

## **Models and Property Rights**

- 1. Property rights not mentioned as a challenge:
  - Property rights typically range from poor to good within each type of model complicating performance assessment
  - Organization features (governance, management) of corporate models are also highly variable
  - Long learning curve for corporate models time is required for new beneficiaries to gain capacity
- 2. Having strong property rights and organizational features is essential for achieving high performance across all models

#### **Tenure Model: Individualization**

#### Performance Challenges

	Incentivized Owners/ Workers	Capital Intensity (D=S)	Economies of Scale	Market Coordination
Freehold/Leasehold				
Small Scale	++	_	_	
Large Scale	_	++	+	++

Oracell Cooler	Larra Caala
Small Scale:	Large Scale:
<ul> <li>Microfinance</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Farm worker rights legislation</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Producer associations</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Worker empowerment</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Registration and Title</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Worker ownership</li> </ul>
Agricultural extension	

## **Tenure Model: Community Demarcation**

#### Performance Challenges

	Incentivized Owners/ Workers	Capital Intensity (D=S)	Economies of Scale	Market Coordination
Community Demarcation			_	
Common Property Association	+-		_	

- Inside boundary registration
- Promote ease of entry and exit in transferring capital invested
- Community mobilization

- Producer associations
- Agricultural research & extension
- Leasing contracts and enforcement to facilitate outside investment

## **Tenure Model: Enabling Land Rental Markets**

#### Performance Challenges

	Incentivized Owners/ Workers	Capital Intensity (D=S)	Economies of Scale	Market Coordination
Land Rental	+	<b>-+</b>	+-	+ -
Sharecropping	+	-+	+-	+
Contract Farming	++	+	+-	+

#### Complementary Policies to Improve Performance:

- Registration and Title
- Leasing contract and enforcement
- Market contract and enforcement

- Producer associations
- Agricultural research & extension
- Microfinance

8

# Institutional Arrangements for Successful Group Farming: Objectives

- 1. Encourage ownership & empower decision making
- 2. Increase (sometimes redistribute) wealth and future benefit streams
- 3. Empower farmworkers
- 4. Retain or attract quality management
- 5. Source capital from the private sector
- 6. Improve worker productivity & labor relations
- 7. Grow wealth and create wages, profit and dividends

## **Tenure Model: Cooperatives**

#### Performance Challenges

	Incentivized Owners/ Workers	Capital Intensity (D=S)	Economies of Scale	Market Coordination
Agricultural Production Coop		+ -	+-	+
Agricultural Marketing Coop	+	+	_	+

- Discourage APC and locking member's land into the coop
- Make voting and benefit rights proportional to investment

- Establish land holding company that leases land to the coop
- Promote accountability, transparency, and good governance

## **Tenure Model: Company or FWES Model**

#### Performance Challenges

	Incentivized Owners/ Workers	Capital Intensity (D=S)	Economies of Scale	Market Coordination
Company (FWES) type models	++	+ -	+	+

- Workers aid in design and participate in decision making
- Make voting/benefit rights proportional to investment
- Develop/observe LT business plan
- Dispute resolution procedures

- Impose ST moratorium on sale of shares to avoid sudden outflows of equity; preserve credit worthiness
- Work on accountability, transparency (external audits), and good governance

## **Take Aways**

- 1. No single best alternative model. Property rights range from poor to good within each
- 2. All models can achieve good performance in the right context especially if property rights and organizational features are provided
- 3. Certain models (APCs) consistently have poor performance
- 4. Focus on first things first: individualization and land markets
- 5. Corporate models require considerable facilitation of communities to build capacity and involve outside investors
- 6. Promote a diversified agrarian structure. Aim public support at encouraging evolution, and providing complementary policy support. Be gradual
- 7. Be wary of recurrent public costs